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NOTES
One can only speculate as to what the Supreme Court will
hold when it has occasion to pass on this amendment.1 In view
of past jurisprudence it would seem that the amendment's con-
stitutionality is doomed; however, with the liberal court which
we have today, there is a good chance that the statute will be
upheld. Undoubtedly the result reached by a decision upholding
it would be just; but the question that presents itself in the writ-
er's mind is whether the result will justify the means. Such rea-
soning could have the effect of extending the jurisdiction of the
federal court far beyond its present bounds.
B.R.D.
MINERAL RIGHTS-PRESCRIPTION AQUIRENDI CAUSA-The land
in question was sold by the original owner to Sanders, who sold
it to Lewis on December 23, 1919, reserving all mineral rights.
On November 1, 1920, Lewis sold the land to Goree, the present
plaintiff, not mentioning the reservation of mineral rights; and
the plaintiffs in good faith took and maintained actual possession
of the land to date of suit, July 27, 1942.
Sanders, who had reserved the mineral rights in the land,
leased his mineral rights on February 14, 1919, to Smitherman
who on April 23, 1921, leased to the Ohio Oil Company. Two wells
were drilled by the Ohio Oil Company in 1922 and oil was pro-
duced from 1922 until September 1931, after which no drilling
took place. The plaintiffs knew of this drilling on the land, but
claimed the ownership of the mineral servitude by ten years
prescription acquirendi causa under Article 3482. The defendants
contended that possession under Article 34871 must be continuous
and uninterrupted; that the drilling operations upon the premises
from 1922 until 1931 constituted a use of their servitude; that the
plaintiff's possession was thereby interrupted; and that therefore
the plaintiff's possession was not continuous and uninterrupted
11. It will be noted that the amendment passed April 20, 1940, applied to
territories as well as the District of Columbia. At the time this note was
written, however, no cases could be found which had passed upon this phase
of the act. It could be upheld under the reasoning used in Winkler v. Daniels,
43 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Va. 1942), since Article 4, Section 3 of the Constitution
gives Congress the right to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respect-
ing the Territory . . . belonging to the United States." It could be declared
unconstitutional under McGarry v. City of Bethlehem, however. Therefore,
any decision which the Supreme Court may reach as to the District of
Columbia would be equally applicable to the territories, and vice versa.
1. Art. 3487, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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as required by Article 3487;2 that when the plaintiff went back
into possession in 1931 after the drilling operations, had ceased, a
new prescription started and since he no longer was in good faith
because he knew the ownership of the servitude was in the de-
fendant, the new prescription was bad faith prescription and
consequently the plaintiff was able to acquire only by thirty years
bad faith prescription. Held, plaintiff acquired title to land
through ten years prescription acquirendi causa; such prescrip-
tion started in good faith; subsequent bad faith did not interrupt
it. Goree v. Sanders, 14 So. (2d) 744 (La. 1943).
The reservation of mineral rights in Louisiana has been
termed a servitudes and as such is subject to the rules of prescrip-
tion applicable to servitudes.4 This is not the first case to apply
the rules of acquisitive prescription5 to mineral rights; although
in the past, liberative prescription has been more frequently
applied."
The requirements for acquisitive prescription under Article
3478 of the Civil Code are good faith possession for ten years
under just title. If possession is started in good faith, subsequent
bad faith does not prevent the prescription.7
Article 3487 states that possession must be "continuous, and
uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal." The Louisi-
2. Ibid.
3. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922); Nabors Oil and Gas Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Co., 151 La. 361, 91
So. 765 (1922); Wemple v. Nabors Oil Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923); Lee
v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923); Patton v. Frost Lumber Industries,
176 La. 916, 147 So. 33 (1933); Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
4. Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana (1939) 38, § 13.
5. Palmer Corp. v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 132 So. 229 (1930); Sample v. Whit-
aker, 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930); Childs v. Porter-Wadley Lumber Co., 190
La. 308, 182 So. 516 (1938).
6. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922); Nabors Oil and Gas Co. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Co., 151 La. 361, 91
So. 765 (1922); Sellington v. Producers' Oil Co., 152 La. 81, 92 So. 742 (1922);
Wemple v. Nabors Oil and Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923); Lee v.
Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923); Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So.
35 (1939).
7. Art. 3482, La. Civil Code of 1870. Devall v. Choppin, 15 La. 581 (1840);
Brewster v. Hewes, 113 La. 45, 36 So. 883 (1904). The Louisiana court goes into
much detail to show that the intermediate possessor in bad faith does not
stop the running of prescription started in good faith. Barrow v. Wilson, 38
La. Ann. 209 (1886); Wilfert v. Duson, 131 La. 21, 58 So. 1019 (1912); Wheat v.
Bayer & Thayer Hardwood Co., 15 La. App. 306, 131 So. 307 (1930). Art. 2269,
French Civil Code, corresponds to our Louisiana article. Troplong, Le Droit
Civil Expliqu6, De la Prescription I (1836) 243, no 432, says that it is sufficient
if good faith had existed at the beginning, and if bad faith follows later that
does not corrupt possession. Baudry-Lacantinerie et Tissier, Trait6 de Droit
Civil, De la Prescription (3 ed. 1905) 408, no 551.
8. Art. 3487, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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ana court has recognized that if these requirements are not met
prescription will not be upheld.!
The corresponding French article contains similar language. 0
Interpreting this article, French authorities have gone into much
detail to explain the meaning of the words continuous and unin-
terrupted." In general, "possession is continuous when it is with-
out cessation and without interruption."'" Once possession is in-
terrupted prescription stops running," and when possession is
regained a new prescription begins to run. Whether it is ten or
thirty years prescription depends on whether the possession was
in good or bad faith at the time the new possession begins.' 4
Drilling operations on land under a mineral reservation have
been deemed sufficient to interrupt prescription both acquirendi'
causa"5 and liberandi causa." Applying this rule the court ad-
mitted that the drilling operations carried on by the defendant
from 1922-1931 interrupted prescription.
The question therefore seems to be whether the possession
of the plaintiff was interrupted, or whether the plaintiff's pos-
session continued unaffected by the interruption of prescription
except that it caused him to be in bad faith, during the period of
1922-1931. If the former is true, according to the French authori-
ties prescription stops and a new prescription begins to run at
the time possession is regained. If the latter, the subsequent bad
faith had no effect upon the prior good faith and the prescription
accrues just as if good faith has been preserved.
9. Prescott v. Payne, 44 La. Ann. 650, 11 So. 140 (1892); Brewer v. Yazoo
and M. V. R., 128 La. 544, 54 So. 987 (1911); Gerrold v. Barnhart, 128 La. 1099,
55 So. 688 (1911); Liles v. Pitts, 145 La. 650, 82 So. 735 (1919).
10. Art. 2229, French Civil Code.
11. Baudry-Lacantinerie et Tissier, op. cit. supra note 7, at 190, no 238 et
seq.; Marcad6, Explication du Code Civil (7 ed. 1874) 115, no 90 et seq.;
Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1926) 165, no 153 et
seq. (on continuity), 683, no 721 (on interruption).
12. Baudry-Lacantinerie et Tissier, op. cit. supra note 7, at 191, no 239:
"La possession et continue lorsqu'elle est sans intermittences, sans lacunes.
11
13. Baudry-Lacantinerie et Tissier, op. cit. supra note 7, at 193, no 241;
Marcad4, op. cit. supra note 11, at 118, no 91; Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra
note 11, at 683, no 721, says the effect of interruption is that all the previous
possession becomes useless. "L'effet de l'interruption est que tout le temps de
possession antdrieur devivent inutile."
14. Baudry-Lacantinerie et Tissier, op. cit. supra note 7, at 404, no 542;
Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 11, at 690, no 732.
15. Connell v. Muslow Oil Co., 186 La. 491, 172 So. 763 (1937).
16. Patton v. Frost Lumber Industries, 176 La. 916, 147 So. 33 (1933); Levy
v. Crawford, Jenkins and Booth, Ltd., 194 La. 757, 194 So. 772 (1940).
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A mineral servitude is an indivisible right.1 7 It is admitted
that the defendant used the servitude; therefore he was in pos-
session of it; and if he was in possession of it, this possession in-
terrupted the possession of the plaintiff. If this conclusion is
adopted, the possession of the defendant was not "continuous and
uninterrupted" as required by Article 348718 and therefore the
prescription was not completed. According to the French authori-
ties, once possession is interrupted, prescription stops running.
When possession is regained, a new prescription begins to run.
In the instant case, after the possession of the plaintiff had been
interrupted by the drilling operations from 1922 to 1931, the plain-
tiff was no longer in good faith, since he knew the mineral servi-
tude was owned by the defendant; therefore, in view of the
French authorities, since the plaintiff was in bad faith, he should
have been able to acquire ownership of the mineral rights only
through thirty years bad faith prescription.
However, the Louisiana court in the instant case did not so
hold, but decided that the possession which was started in good
faith continued during the time the drilling and producing opera-
tions were carried on, and that the plaintiff was merely in bad
faith during this period. The court based its decision upon Article
3482,19 which states that possession started in good faith, followed
by subsequent bad faith, does not prevent the running of ten
years good faith prescription.
In view of the fact that the case involved a novel point of
prescription and that no cases in point are available in Louisiana
jurisprudence-it is submitted that the French authorities could
have furnished a basis of a decision more in line with legal prin-
ciples. M.E.C.
QUITCLAIM DEED-BASIS OF TEN YEAR PRESCRIPTION AcQUIRENDI
CAusA-Defendant claims title to a twenty acre tract of land by
ten years acquisitive prescription, basing his good faith on a quit-
claim deed. Plaintiff contends that the unwarranted deed is not
enough for acquiring in good faith: the non-warranty being
enough to excite the defendant's suspicion, put him on guard, and
induce him to make inquiries as to the validity of his title-the
defendant remaining in bad faith until such inquiry is made.
17. Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931); Clark v. Tensas
Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931). Daggett, op. cit. supra note 4, at
24, § 6.
18. Art. 3487, La. Civil Code of 1870.
19. Art. 3482, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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